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THE HIGH PRICE OF POVERTY IN 
ARKANSAS’S COURTS: RETHINKING THE 
UTILITY OF MUNICIPAL FINES AND FEES 
Madison Miller* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The opposite of poverty is not wealth.  It is justice.  
— Bryan Stevenson, Esq.1 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, a “trail of tax cuts” led to budget 
shortfalls and revenue gaps throughout the United States.2  These 
budgetary problems resulted in many cities and towns shifting 
their burden of funding courts and the justice system at large “to 
the ‘users’ of the courts, including those least equipped to pay.”3  
Although “jailing an indigent person for a fine-only, low-level 
offense is unconstitutional,” it is still an ongoing practice in many 
states, including Arkansas.4  In 1995, Arkansas passed new 
legislation to govern its circuit courts’ collection and enforcement 
of fines and fees.5  One subsection of this chapter explicitly 
provides that the “court shall inquire into the defendant’s ability 
to pay and shall make a determination of the defendant’s financial 
 
        * J.D. Candidate, The University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022.  Arkansas Law 
Notes Editor for the Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022.  The author thanks Associate Dean 
Tiffany Murphy of the University of Arkansas School of Law for her guidance and advice 
in writing this Comment.  The author also thanks David Sachar for his invaluable insight into 
Arkansas’s Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission.  The author thanks the Criminal 
Justice Project at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights for its unrelenting efforts to 
remedy this injustice and for igniting her passion for this cause.  The author would also like 
to thank her family for their lifelong support in her educational endeavors, and Tyler for his 
unwavering encouragement and support.   
        1. PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 
IN AMERICA xix (2017) (emphasis added). 
2. Id. at xv.  
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 4. 
5. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-701 to 712 (1995). 
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ability to pay the fine.”6  Although this procedural safety net is 
embedded in the statute, it has not served its intended purpose for 
several reasons.   
A large part of the problem stems from courts’ partial or, in 
many cases, complete neglect of this mandated analysis.7  One 
contributing factor is that “the statute does not enumerate types of 
information to be considered before making an ability to pay 
determination.”8  Therefore, many judges fail to conduct a truly 
meaningful analysis when determining an individual’s realistic 
ability to pay.  In Arkansas, the law mandates an inquiry into 
whether the person can show that his or her failure to pay was not 
“purposeful” or a result of a lack of “good-faith effort” before 
imposing jail time.9  However, in practice, “the entire inquiry 
[may] rest[] on a judge’s observations of whether defendants 
possess random items, such as cigarettes, smart phones, or brand 
name clothing.”10  There are endless examples of people whose 
struggles illuminate the real-world effects of these arbitrary 
determinations.   
Kimberly Snodgrass, a named plaintiff in Mahoney v. 
Derrick,11 was convicted for failure to pay ten separate times over 
four years because she could not afford the monthly payments the 
judge imposed.12  However, the presiding judge did not conduct 
the requisite evaluation of Kimberly’s ability to pay, as is required 
by Arkansas law,13 even though “[a]ll but one of her jail records 
indicate[d] she was unemployed at the time of arrest.”14  Upon 
each conviction, she endured up to thirty days in jail, as well as 
 
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(5)(A) (emphasis added).  
7. MYESHA BRADEN ET AL., LAWS.’ COMM. FOR CIV. RTS UNDER L., TOO POOR TO 
PAY: HOW ARKANSAS’S OFFENDER-FUNDED JUSTICE SYSTEM DRIVES POVERTY & MASS 
INCARCERATION 9 (2019), [https://perma.cc/AU7R-C2E9].  
8. Id. at 10. 
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-703. 
10. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16. 
11. See generally Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 12-13, 
Mahoney v. Derrick, No. 60CV-18-5616 (Aug. 9, 2018).  Mahoney v. Derrick is a class 
action lawsuit that was filed against a White County District Court Judge in an effort to put 
an end to his unlawful behavior in his assessment of fines and fees.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 82-89.  
12. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16. 
13. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(5)(A) (1995).  
14. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 28. 
4 MILLER.MAN.FIN. COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:50 PM 
2021]   RETHINKING MUNICIPAL FINES 549 
 
additional charges between $450.00 and $670.00 tacked onto her 
existing outstanding debt.15  Aside from added charges, each 
payment made towards an outstanding debt’s principal balance 
has a portion deducted as an administrative interest fee.16  As a 
result of her repeated incarceration and mounting debt, Kimberly 
“lost two jobs, her driver’s license has been suspended multiple 
times, and she has lost housing four times; each time losing much 
of what she and her children owned.”17   
Tragically, Kimberly’s story is not unique.  Tina Phares, then 
a forty-seven-year-old mother and former accounts manager with 
an associate degree, had a similarly disastrous experience with the 
Arkansas courts.18  Tina’s story began when she turned to drugs 
after a series of personal tragedies, including the deaths of her 
father and toddler son, an accident that left her husband 
“hospitalized [and] in an induced coma for a year,” and a 
tumultuous divorce.19  Over the subsequent years, before entering 
a treatment program in 2017, she was “convicted of failure to pay 
nine times and sentenced to 30 days in jail seven times.”20  At one 
point, the judge issued an arrest warrant for failure to pay “less 
than [a] month after she was released on two consecutive 30-day[] 
sentences for convictions of failure to pay[,]”21 allowing her 
almost no time to get back on her feet and earn an income.   
While Tina has made personal strides, such as becoming 
drug-free and, in 2018, “bringing home her first paycheck since 
her son died[,]” her life and personal progress remain stagnated 
by the over $15,000 in debt she owes to the court.22  Like in 
Kimberly’s case, there was no inquiry conducted to determine 
Tina’s ability to pay the fines and fees levied against her.23  Had 
 
15. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16 (explaining that, on average, Kimberly has 
spent “one of every three days in the White County Detention Center” since the time of her 
first arrest in September 2014). 
16. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-704(b)(1)(A) (2017). 
17. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16. 




21. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 20. 
22. Personal Narrative: Tina Marie, supra note 18.   
23. Id. 
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the proper examination been performed, the judge likely would 
have recognized the personal hardships, battle with addiction, and 
lack of employment and financial resources that impeded Tina’s 
ability to pay.  Moreover, Tina might have never spent time in 
jail, and she certainly would not have been burdened with 
thousands of dollars in debt (totaling approximately $15,000 in 
2018).24  
Because of the unlawful actions of one judge, both Kimberly 
and Tina were jailed on failure to pay warrants for more than 150 
days over a three-to-four-year period, and both have incurred 
additional debt of “between $4,000 and $5,000 in fines and costs 
for the same charges.”25  These two first-hand accounts are drops 
in the bucket of the endless stories of personal and financial ruin 
brought on by the courts.26  Thousands of Arkansans remain 
bogged down by outrageous mounting debt stemming from 
flagrant disregard for the law and Arkansas’s Constitution.27  
Many people have spent time in prison, lost jobs, missed 
opportunities for personal and financial growth, and some have 
even lost custody of their children because of their inability to 
afford the debt imposed on them by Arkansas courts.28   
While the initial response is oftentimes, “don’t do the crime 
if you can’t do the time,” the goal of this Comment is to illustrate 
how the issue is much more complex than a simple form of 
appropriate retribution or punishment.  Many people find 
themselves in this treacherous cycle due to low-level civil 
offenses, such as a single traffic ticket or a minor housing code 
violation.29  These are not felony convictions; many times, these 
are not even infractions that carry with them more than a fine, 
much less jail time.  The preamble to the United States 
Constitution expressly references the goals of “establish[ing] 
 
24. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 10. 
25. Id. at 28. 
26. See generally NEIL SEALY ET AL., ARK. CMTY. INST., CAN’T WIN FOR LOSING: 
HOW INSTITUTIONS & POLICIES KEEP ARKANSANS IN DEBT 11-12 (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/PNA8-YUD7].  
27. See generally id. 
28. See, e.g., Personal Narrative: Nikita, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/NS9T-7MH7].  
29. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 6; see also SEALY ET AL., supra note 26, at 11-12.   
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Justice, . . . promot[ing] the general Welfare, and secur[ing] the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”30  This 
Comment will argue that until we remedy these grave injustices, 
inflicted primarily upon low-income Arkansans, we are not living 
up to these ideals.   
While the issue is complex, the premise is simple.  It is 
wrong to jail poor people or add hundreds of dollars at a time to 
the principal of their debt solely because they cannot afford to 
pay, and it should not be happening in the State of Arkansas.  The 
Arkansas statutes and United States Supreme Court cases31 that 
address this issue have not served their intended purpose of 
safeguarding constitutional rights.  Therefore, Arkansas should 
make a concerted effort to end this unconstitutional practice that 
is a waste of taxpayer dollars, with the cost of incarceration 
typically exceeding the amount in dispute.32  The Arkansas 
Legislature should address this urgent problem by adding 
specificity to the existing statute in the form of factors a judge 
must consider when making an ability-to-pay determination.   
Additionally, community members and non-profit 
organizations should continue pushing for reform through 
litigation.  To enact real change, there must be accountability.  
Given the obstacle of judicial immunity in litigation, plaintiffs, 
lawyers, and concerned citizens alike should utilize Arkansas’s 
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission (“JDDC”) to 
report repeat-offender judges and ensure that unethical or 
unlawful behavior does not go unpunished.  Arkansas should 
prioritize this effort and establish a uniform system to guarantee 
equal protection under the law for its citizens and promote 
confidence in its courts and the judiciary.  Furthermore, many 
individuals facing unlawful treatment do not have the time, 
connections, or resources to continue litigating a case for years 
through proceedings and appeals.  While courts can serve as an 
 
30. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
31. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that “[t]here can be no equal 
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has”); see also 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).  
32. MATTHEW MENENDEZ ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND FINES 5 (2019), [https://perma.cc/YE9N-AR3E]. 
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effective mechanism for plaintiffs, we should not accept the 
notion that the existence of courts as an avenue for recourse 
somehow negates the serious nature of judges flouting the law. 
This Comment will proceed with four main parts.  Part II 
will provide background on the subject matter to furnish a 
foundational understanding of the issue.  Part III will explain how 
the municipal fines and fees system functions in Arkansas.  Part 
IV will propose possible solutions and practical remedies that, if 
utilized, could generate more positive outcomes for Arkansas’s 
local and municipal governments and their citizens.  Finally, Part 
V concludes that making meaningful reforms in this area is both 
morally and economically imperative.  
II.  BACKGROUND: THE “FINES AND FEES” 
CONUNDRUM 
For at least two decades, the new criminalization of poverty 
crept into communities large and small, driven by misbegotten 
law enforcement politics and the search for revenue, but with 
little public attention.33 
 
“A debtors’ prison is any prison, jail, or other detention 
facility in which people are incarcerated for their inability, 
refusal, or failure to pay debt.”34  The federal government 
outlawed debtors’ prisons in 1833.35  However, it was not until a 
series of cases between 1970 and 1983 that the Supreme Court 
established the unconstitutionality of incarcerating people simply 
because they cannot afford to pay fines and fees that the State has 
levied upon them.36  The Court’s opinion in Bearden v. Georgia 
 
33. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at xviii. 
34. Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 
24, 2015, 7:15 AM), [https://perma.cc/X7N3-3KMY].   
35. Id.   
36. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 235, 240-41 (establishing that the Equal Protection 
Clause is violated when a defendant is imprisoned for an amount of time exceeding the 
statutory maximum on the basis of an inability to pay a fine or court costs); Tate, 401 U.S. 
at 397 (opining that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when a crime is punishable only 
by fine for those who can afford to pay it, but by prison for those who cannot); Bearden, 461 
U.S. at 668 (holding that incarcerating an indigent defendant for failure to pay a fine violates 
the Equal Protection Clause unless the defendant has the financial means to pay, and thus, 
nonpayment is willful).  
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was, and remains, arguably the most consequential case on this 
issue.37  Although Bearden established that courts must conduct 
an analysis into a defendant’s ability to pay and must not imprison 
him or her for failure to pay unless the failure was willful, the 
opinion did not give explicit instruction regarding what exactly 
the Court meant by “willfully refused to pay.”38   
Because of this lack of clarity, municipal judges frequently 
ignore state law and the standard set forth by the Supreme Court 
in Bearden.39  One consequence of this initial failure to conduct a 
meaningful analysis of an individual’s ability to pay is that, in 
many cases, the individual is then placed on a payment plan with 
the court that he or she may not be able to keep up with.  As a 
result, if an individual defaults on their payment plan and the 
judge issues a bench warrant for his or her arrest, “Bearden 
becomes irrelevant”40 because the individual’s failure to pay 
“constitutes criminal contempt, which allows incarceration as 
well as further fines and fees.”41  Once a person commits a “crime 
that allows jailing,” such as contempt, “there is no protection for 
indigence.”42  In turn, this creates a loophole that results in 
punishing people for their inability to pay.43  
The truth is, while they are not referred to as “debtors’ 
prisons” by name, local jails across the country are full of people 
incarcerated based upon their inability to pay fines and fees.44  
The American Action Forum estimates that roughly “10 million 
 
37. See generally EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
38. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668; EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 5. 
39. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 5. 
40. Id. at 6. 
41. Id. at 5. 
42. Id. at 6. 
43. Cf. Cortney E. Lollar, Eliminating the Criminal Debt Exception for Debtors’ 
Prisons, 98 N.C. L. REV. 427, 434 (2020) (stating that while “[a] person who is incarcerated 
because she does not have the ability to pay a [] legal [financial] obligation might well be 
deterred from engaging in any further criminal activity, but when the failure to pay in and of 
itself becomes criminal activity justifying further incarceration, the deterrence value is 
difficult to ascertain”).   
44. Tara O’Neill Hayes & Margaret Barnhorst, Incarceration and Poverty in the 
United States, AM. ACTION F. (June 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/97HP-MDYF]; see also 
Lollar, supra note 43, at 434-35 (arguing that “courts and legislators should eliminate 
incarceration for the nonpayment of” legal financial obligations because “[s]ufficient 
mechanisms are already in place for those who have assets but choose not to disgorge 
them[,]” such as property seizure and wage garnishment).  
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people owe $50 billion in legal fees, fines, and penalties” in the 
United States.45  Despite their legal obligation to do so, “many 
courts refuse to consider a person’s financial condition” when 
imposing fines and fees and “at times[,] reject attempts to explain 
dire financial circumstances such as homelessness, the needs of 
dependent children, and the like by explicitly stating that [court-
imposed] debt must take priority over such concerns.”46 
While fines, imposed at the time of conviction, are intended 
to serve the dual purposes of punishment and deterrence, fees, on 
the contrary, “are intended to raise revenue” and often “bear no 
relation to the offense committed.”47  Arkansas’s Constitution 
specifically states that “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt 
in any civil action . . . unless in cases of fraud.”48  Additionally, if 
a “defendant claims an inability to pay [a] fine, the court shall 
inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay and shall make a 
determination of the defendant’s financial ability to pay the 
fine.”49  If an individual elects to pay a fine in installments, there 
is an added fee (essentially an interest charge) deducted from his 
or her payment each month.50  These additional fees prolong the 
amount of time it takes to pay off the debt, allowing the 
municipality to rake in extra revenue and profit at the expense of 
its community’s most vulnerable members. 
Further, a missed payment can wreak havoc on a person’s 
life in endless ways.  Some judges in Arkansas will revoke the 
person’s driver’s license and registration as punishment, despite 
not having the authority to do so.51  This unlawful yet pervasive 
 
45. Hayes & Barnhorst, supra note 44 (adding that roughly 5,000 people in the United 
States are incarcerated because they are unable to afford release).   
46. Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ 
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 59 (2018) (detailing the account of one father of four who has 
had to prioritize paying court debt over paying his electricity bill, buying his child a winter 
coat, and providing food and shelter for his family, lamenting that “[i]t doesn’t matter what 
[his] family suffers, so long as the court gets paid”).  
47. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 6. 
48. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 16. 
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(a)(5)(A) (1995) (emphasis added). 
50. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-704(b)(1)(A) (2017).  
51. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-402 (2021) (granting the Department of Finance and 
Administration’s Office of Driver Services complete authority over administering laws 
pertaining to suspension and revocation of driver’s licenses); BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, 
at 2. 
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practice is counterproductive, as many people, particularly those 
in rural areas of Arkansas, do not have adequate access to public 
transportation.52  The lack of access to transportation coupled 
with a suspended license may cause a person to lose their job, 
further hindering their ability to pay off their debt.53 
While non-profits like the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law (“Lawyers’ Committee”) and the American 
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) have made litigating these “fines 
and fees” cases a priority, another available avenue of recourse is 
reporting repeat-offender judges to the Judicial Discipline and 
Disability Commission in Arkansas (“JDDC”).54  Arkansans 
adopted a constitutional amendment establishing this commission 
in November 1988,55 which “investigates and may take 
disciplinary action or, in the most serious cases, recommend to 
the Arkansas Supreme Court that it impose discipline upon a 
judge whose actions are found to be a violation of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct.”56   
There are several possible disciplinary remedies that the 
Commission may recommend.  However, in the most serious 
cases, “the [Arkansas] Supreme Court has the power to suspend, 
remove or involuntarily retire or censure judges based on the 
Commission’s recommendation.”57  In less serious cases, the 
Commission acts independently to mandate professional 
counseling and issue public admonishments, reprimands, or 
censures to judges who have violated the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.58  This process is worthwhile because it puts the judge 
on notice of his or her misconduct.  Additionally, as public record, 
 
52. Rayla Bellis, More Than One Million Households Without a Car in Rural America 
Need Better Transit, T4AMERICA BLOG (May 15, 2020), [https://perma.cc/X33T-KNF3]; 
BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
53. See BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
54. See Press Release, Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, Letter of 
Admonishment (Mar. 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/SX78-MJ3F] (publicly admonishing 
District Court Judge Keith Blackman of Craighead County for his practice of exacting illegal 
fees on certain defendants “for changing a plea from ‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty[,]’” and formally 
putting Judge Blackman on notice that this practice was unlawful).  
55. See ARK. CONST. amend. 66.  
56. About the Commission, JUD. DISCIPLINE & DISABILITY COMM’N, 
[https://perma.cc/3G3Q-7WAH] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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it may deter other judges from similar actions, resulting in 
increased judicial accountability and incentivizing judges to 
adhere to Arkansas’s laws and Constitution.  
Making these reforms would most certainly benefit indigent 
Arkansans, but the State’s population as a whole would reap 
positive benefits as well.  A 2020 study conducted by the Center 
for American Progress found that 16.2% of Arkansans live in 
poverty, with African Americans accounting for the largest 
percentage of that group at 27.1%.59  This indicator ranks 
Arkansas at 47th out of the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
in overall poverty.60   
The criminal justice system greatly depletes Arkansans’ tax 
dollars.  Arkansas has seventy-five counties, each with a county 
jail.61  In 2018, Arkansas’s incarceration rate was 589 per 100,000 
residents, far surpassing 2018’s national average of 374 per 
100,000 residents.62  Over the last forty years, Arkansas’s prison 
population has continued to increase steadily, skyrocketing from 
2,911 in 1980, to 11,851 in 2000, to 17,713 in 2019.63  These 
numbers do not even include the jail population in Arkansas’s 
county jails, totaling 8,610 in 2013.64  Sebastian County, the 
fourth largest county in Arkansas, proposed a county budget for 
the year 2020 with the jail budget listed at $6,774,888, “a 5.8% 
increase from the total jail budget from 2019[,]” consuming a 
quarter of the proposed general fund budget, “making the jail the 
highest-funded department in the general fund.”65 
According to the Brennan Center for Justice, “almost every 
state has increased criminal and civil court fees or added new 
 
59. Arkansas 2020, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, [https://perma.cc/C2UC-EX85] (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2021).  
60. Overall Poverty 2020, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, [https://perma.cc/Z57Z-9WJG] 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
61. Arkansas 2018, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., [https://perma.cc/GXU2-J9P6] (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2021).  
62. Id.; 2018 National Averages, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., [https://perma.cc/38QJ-
B6UF] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021). 
63. State-by-State Data: Prison Population Over Time, SENT’G PROJECT, 
[https://perma.cc/8D2J-YRV3] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).  
64. Id. 
65. Thomas Saccente, Proposed ‘20 budget for Arkansas Jail Grows, ARK. ONLINE 
(Oct. 20, 2019), [https://perma.cc/PJJ3-6JB9].  
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ones” since 2008 as a way to increase revenue.66  However, the 
Brennan Center’s report explains in detail just how inefficient this 
practice is.  For instance, the report points out that not only does 
jailing people who are unable to pay the fines and fees imposed 
on them fail to generate revenue, but it also comes at a high cost, 
“sometimes as much as 115 percent” more than the outstanding 
amount.67  The imposition of fines and court costs provides more 
than 20% of the revenue for “nearly half of local governments.”68  
Every state in the nation is squandering money it could invest in 
infrastructure, better public schools, and improved public 
health.69  Instead, it is invested in jailing individuals for low-level 
offenses, including failure to pay court fines and fees.70  Worse 
yet, jailing an individual only further handicaps their ability to 
pay their legal financial obligations, and therefore, is a lose-lose 
situation for all parties involved.  
III.  THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN 
ARKANSAS 
There are a variety of scenarios around the country, but they 
all add up to the same thing:  prosecuting people for low-level 
offenses, squeezing them for money, and jailing them if they miss 
payments, in a cruel game of “pay or stay.”71 
 
Because the United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
jailing an indigent individual for failure to pay is 
 
66. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 6. 
67. Id. at 5 (additionally, the report points out that the actual costs are even higher than 
the estimated amounts because many of the costs associated with the debt collection are 
unascertainable).  
68. Hayes & Barnhorst, supra note 44. 
69. See MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 5, 9; Christopher Ingram, The States That 
Spend More Money on Prisoners Than College Students, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016), 
[https://perma.cc/99CD-M7KX]. 
70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 9; see also 
Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/KD5K-QB96]; see generally Terry-Ann 
Craigie et al., Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings: How Involvement with the 
Criminal Justice System Deepens Inequality, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 15, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/7N2R-NBT3]. 
71. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 9. 
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unconstitutional,72 upholding this ruling should be relatively 
simple.  However, Bearden’s language that a failure to pay must 
be “willful” for incarceration to be an appropriate remedy73 has 
left lower courts with too much discretion in determining what 
exactly “willful” means.  In 2009, the Arkansas Court of Appeals 
clearly stated that when a defendant violates the terms of their 
sentence in the form of a failure to pay, “the State has the burden 
of proving that the failure to pay restitution was inexcusable.”74  
However, once the State presents that evidence, “the defendant 
has the burden of presenting some reasonable excuse for his 
failure to pay.”75   
In Jordan v. State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that 
“[a] defendant’s failure to make bona fide efforts to seek 
employment or to borrow money to pay restitution may justify 
imprisonment.”76  While seeking employment seems reasonable, 
the suggestion that someone may go to jail because they have not 
made “bona fide efforts” to borrow money from people in their 
life is not reasonable and is entirely too subjective.  Additionally, 
borrowing money would place the person in the same position of 
owing money to someone or something—keeping them indebted.  
Arkansas law mandates that in determining the method of 
payment of restitution, the court take into account:  
(A) The financial resources of the defendant and the burden 
that payment of restitution will impose with regard to 
another obligation of the defendant;  
(B) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an 
installment basis or on another condition to be fixed by the 
court; and  
(C) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment 
of restitution and the method of payment.77   
While this may sound like “the bases are covered,” what is 
happening in practice is an entirely different story. 
 
72. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1983). 
73. Id. at 668. 
74. Beebe v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 113, at 2, 303 S.W.3d 89, 90.   
75. Id. 
76. 327 Ark. 117, 122, 939 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1997).  
77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2)(A)-(C) (2015).  
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One would be hard-pressed to find a better example of this 
statute’s inefficacy than the courtroom of one White County 
District Judge.78  During his 2016 campaign, the judge was quoted 
in the Searcy Daily Citizen admitting, “I know my fines are a lot 
higher [than other judges] . . . I have a policy:  Stay out of trouble 
for four years . . . Make your monthly payments . . . If they can 
do that for four years, they can do it for the rest of their lives.”79  
Further, he proceeds by saying, “I try to hammer them at the front 
end and make them want to change, then I give them incentive.”80  
One of the many issues with this approach is that his self-
proclaimed “zero tolerance” policy81 is outside of his purview as 
a judge.   
Court filings in Mahoney v. Derrick—the class action 
lawsuit brought against the judge—further outline his behavior, 
asserting that the judge “routinely sentences individuals 
convicted of failure to pay to twice the length of jail time as those 
convicted of the most serious misdemeanors under State law.  He 
does not credit the jail time against their debt; instead, the jail time 
is in addition to new debt imposed.”82  The Complaint goes on to 
allege not only that “[t]housands of individuals currently owe 
debt in [the judge’s] courts[,]” but also that he has “jailed some 
[individuals] while they live[d] in tents or shelters.”83   
The judge confirmed in a deposition that he issues arrest 
warrants and jails individuals who miss a single payment with no 
pre-arrest determination of “whether that person failed to make 
their fine payments knowingly and willfully.”84  Further, he 
concedes to his failure to act in accordance with the Arkansas 
Fines Collection Law, stating that he does not consider an 
individual’s ability to pay at sentencing, and does not consider 
 
78. See Alan Pyke, A Judge in Arkansas Makes $147,000 a Year for Turning Poor 
People into Indentured Servants, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 9, 2018, 3:27 PM), 
[https://perma.cc/6BB6-ZJZN].  
79. Id. 
80. Id. (it is unclear what exactly this “incentive” is). 
81. Max Brantley, New Lawsuit on ‘Debtor Prison’ Practices in White County 
UPDATE, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4JBP-6TKZ].  
82. Id.  
83. Id. 
84. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Mahoney 
v. Derrick, No. 73CV-18-874 (Aug. 3, 2020).  
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“whether the $100 per month payment plan he imposes causes a 
severe and undue hardship on that person or his or her 
dependents.”85 
Because of the position of trust and authority that judges 
occupy in our society, the very least the public should expect them 
to do is follow and uphold the law.  One might think that when 
such disregard for the law is exposed, the thousands of people 
who have faced financial ruin as a result of the injustice would 
have their debts forgiven, or at least receive some sort of 
compensation.  However, that is not the case.  The Circuit Court 
of White County granted summary judgment for the defendant 
judge in Mahoney based on his entitlement to “absolute judicial 
immunity.”86  The plaintiffs got nothing.87  However, even if the 
court had ruled in their favor, the tens of thousands of dollars in 
debt that they collectively owe to the judge’s courts would have 
remained unsettled, and they would not have received any 
compensation.88  Because the plaintiffs only sought declaratory 
relief, a court order would have simply mandated that the judge 
modify his actions to accord with Arkansas’s laws when imposing 
and enforcing the collection of fines and fees.89  
Such an outcome is a crushing blow to indigent people’s 
quest for justice in Arkansas and across the country.  When a 
judge acknowledges under oath that he engages in practices that 
violate state law, as well as numerous rulings set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court with impunity, that should be 
concerning.  The egregious and ongoing nature of the judge’s 
practices met with the outcome of this case leaves only one 
conclusion:  there must be a new route to recourse for indigent 
Arkansans.   
 
85. Id. 
86. Order and Judgment at 4, Mahoney v. Derrick, No. 73CV-18-874 (Dec. 30, 2020).  
87. Id.  
88. This is because the plaintiffs were seeking declaratory relief, which “refers to a 
court’s judgment stating the rights of parties without ordering any specific action or listing 
awards for damages.”  Declaratory Relief, CORNELL L. SCH. (June 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/Y9KQ-T8TV].  
89. See id. 
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In its 1998 opinion in Robinson v. Langdon,90 the Arkansas 
Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test 
for judicial immunity articulated in Cleavinger v. Saxner.91  This 
test articulates six factors for consideration: 
(1) the need to assure that the individual can perform his 
functions without harassment or intimidation;  
(2) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for 
private damages actions as a means of controlling 
unconstitutional conduct;  
(3) insulation from political influence;  
(4) the importance of precedent;  
(5) the adversary nature of the process; and  
(6) the correctability of error on appeal. 92   
The Trial Handbook for Arkansas Lawyers further elaborates on 
this concept, noting that “[t]his immunity applies even when a 
judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly[,]” and that 
“[t]he rationale . . . is not to protect or benefit malicious or corrupt 
judges, but to benefit the public, whose interest it is that judges 
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence 
and without fear of consequences.”93  
While some of these justifications sound sensible when 
assessed at face value, the rationale that failing to punish judicial 
wrongdoing is somehow to the community’s benefit is an 
argument that holds little weight when looking at an example like 
the Mahoney case.  First, a judge’s “errors” are not always errors 
which an appeal could remedy.94  Second, when a judge is not 
exactly “perform[ing] his functions”95 in an ethical way, instead 
of protecting him as the hypothetical target of harassment or 
intimidation, the courts should prioritize the public’s best interest.  
Courts should not ignore the ways in which the judge violated his 
 
90. 333 Ark. 662, 670, 970 S.W.2d 292, 296 (1998). 
91. 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985).  
92. Robinson, 333 Ark. at 670, 970 S.W.2d at 296. 
93. 3 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ARKANSAS LAWYERS § 9:21 
(2020-2021 ed.).   
94. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89; see also Declaratory Relief, supra note 
88. 
95. Robinson, 333 Ark. at 670, 970 S.W.2d at 296. 
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oath of office and ultimately ensured members of his community 
stayed intrenched in poverty for years.96   
What started as a “zero-tolerance” policy ultimately resulted 
in a pattern of unconstitutional failures to conduct inquiries into 
individuals’ ability to pay, incarcerating many of those 
individuals when they could not pay, and continuing to levy 
additional fines and fees upon them for years.97  Many Arkansans 
will never financially or emotionally recover from their 
entanglement in this system, and granting the judge absolute 
judicial immunity does not protect the interests of Arkansas’s 
citizens.   
Additionally, the plaintiffs in Mahoney were not seeking 
monetary damages.98  Therefore, allowing the doctrine of judicial 
immunity to bar the imposition of declaratory relief to stop 
unlawful behavior—with no monetary damages at stake as a 
possible remedy—seems rather ludicrous.  While the argument 
that the judicial immunity doctrine furthers the public interest 
because “judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences”99 certainly 
makes sense in some situations, this doctrine must be narrowed, 
clarified, and reformed for its stated policy objectives to function 
as intended.   
Judicial immunity should not serve as a complete barrier to 
justice for individuals treated in an antithetical way to that which 
most Arkansans would deem ethical, appropriate, or deserving of 
a position of power and respect.  Furthermore, a doctrine created 
to alleviate judges from “fear of consequences” might not serve 
the public’s best interest.100  Instead, establishing a doctrine that 
provides judges with reasonable protection from suit while still 
preserving a strong mechanism for accountability and the 
imposition of appropriate consequences would be more suitable.  
Judges swear an oath to uphold our state laws and constitution, 
 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 78-90.  
97. See Matthew Martinez, Arkansas judge throws defendants ‘too poor to pay’ in 
‘debtors’ prison,’ lawsuit says, Fort Worth Star Telegram (Aug. 10, 2018, 10:10 AM), 
[https://perma.cc/9UWC-673Y]. 
98. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 1. 
99. 3 HALL, JR., supra note 93, § 9:21.  
100. See id. 
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and it is in the best interest of the public to ensure judges uphold 
these oaths.   
However, in November 2017, the ACLU of Arkansas and 
the Lawyers’ Committee were successful in settling a lawsuit in 
which the city of Sherwood, Pulaski County, and the district court 
judge were the named defendants.101  This settlement mandated 
that “Sherwood’s ‘hot check’ court [would] no longer jail people 
who can’t afford to pay court fines and fees imposed for bouncing 
a check . . . [and] requires the court to evaluate each defendant’s 
ability to pay before determining the person’s sentence.”102  
Several factors could point to why this outcome was so different.  
The fact that the city and county were themselves named 
defendants, and thus, were not entitled to judicial immunity, may 
have provided a greater incentive to settle.  Maybe it was because 
this case was litigated in federal court as opposed to state court.103  
However, the fact that the settlement had to include a mandate to 
evaluate each individual’s ability to pay, which the law already 
requires, further demonstrates the shirking of the law that is 
occurring in some of Arkansas’s courtrooms. 
IV.  THE PATH TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE 
SYSTEM IN ARKANSAS 
Ferguson was a spark that turned isolated instances of 
activism into a national conversation and produced numerous 
 
101. Dade v. City of Sherwood, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF ARK., 
[https://perma.cc/Q9AN-JMQE] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).  
102. Id.; see also Linda Satter, Under Deal, 1 Arkansas Court to Back Off Jailing Over 
Hot Checks, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Nov. 15, 2017, 4:30 AM), 
[https://perma.cc/8WBR-747M] (One plaintiff in the case “wrote a single bad check for 
$28.93 in 2011 that, by the time the suit was filed [in 2016], had resulted in her being arrested 
at least seven times, paying nearly $3,300 in fines, fees and court costs, and spending 25 
days in jail . . . . [T]he lead plaintiff, Charles Dade, spent more than 100 days in jail and was 
assessed about $4,000 in fines, fees and court costs because of six bounced checks totaling 
$360 that he wrote in 2009.”).  
103. See Complaint—Class Action at 6, Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 4:16-CV-
00602-JM (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 2016), [https://perma.cc/68TN-WKLV] (bringing “civil 
rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution”). 
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examples of partnerships between advocates and decision-
makers.104 
 
In 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released the 
findings from its investigation of the Police Department in 
Ferguson, Missouri, highlighting the fact that “Ferguson law 
enforcement efforts are focused on generating revenue.”105  As a 
result, many states and localities began to face pressure to 
reevaluate the use of fines and fees to generate revenue.106  While 
there are many meritorious ideas regarding the most effective 
ways to achieve reform, this section will focus on three practical 
suggestions to make strides towards a more just and equitable 
system in Arkansas.   
A. Utilizing the Arkansas JDDC to Punish Judicial 
Misconduct 
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a 
formal opinion regarding the “[e]thical obligations of judges in 
collecting legal financial obligations and other debts,”107 
following the DOJ’s groundbreaking report detailing law 
enforcement’s unlawful practices in Ferguson, Missouri.108  The 
nexus between the ABA’s opinion and the DOJ’s report is that 
they both address unlawful practices of government and law 
enforcement officials in their focus on generating revenue.   
The ABA opinion asserts that to comply with the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct, judges must “undertake a meaningful 
inquiry into a litigant’s ability to pay court fines, fees, restitution, 
 
104. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 10. 
105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 (2015) (quote in all capitals in the original). 
106. See Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. 
(Mar. 1, 2015), [https://perma.cc/K9HM-PJ4Y] (asserting that “[t]he publication of the 
Ferguson report is widely viewed as the start of the movement to reform fines and fees in the 
U.S.”).  
107. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490 (2020) (quote in all capitals 
in the original) (discussing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s clear mandate for 
meaningful inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay before incarcerating a defendant for 
failing to pay).  
108. See id. at 2.  
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other charges, bail, or civil debt before using incarceration as 
punishment for failure to pay, as inducement to pay or appear, or 
as a method of purging a financial obligation whenever state or 
federal law so provides.”109  According to the ABA, Rules 1.1, 
1.2, 2.2, 2.5, and 2.6 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct all 
require meaningful inquiry as “a fundamental element of 
procedural justice necessary to maintain the integrity, 
impartiality, and fairness of the administration of justice and the 
public’s faith in it.”110   
The opinion clearly states that “[a]s long as a defendant’s 
failure to pay is due to genuine financial incapacity, alternatives 
to incarceration must be explored.”111  Furthermore, it emphasizes 
the necessity for consistently followed and “carefully prescribed 
procedures” to promote uniformity—opining that failing to adopt 
and adhere to such policies in failure to pay proceedings that 
could result in incarceration “strikes at the very roots of the fair 
and impartial administration of justice and poses a direct threat to 
public faith in the legitimacy of the judicial process.”112   
While some judges have been able to evade legal 
accountability through the judicial immunity doctrine, this 
doctrine does not shield them from ethical consequences.  In 
McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and 
Disability Orders, the D.C. Circuit explained that “the 
constitutional measures meant to protect judicial independence 
were not intended to insulate individual judges from 
accountability to ‘the world as a whole (including the judicial 
branch itself),’ but ‘to safeguard the branch’s independence from 
its two competitors.’”113  There is a fine line between judicial 
misconduct and simple legal error.114  While the “mere legal 
 
109. Id. at 1. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 3. 
112. ABA Formal Op. 490, supra note 107 (quoting the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
opinion in a judicial disciplinary case in which it recognized that for many litigants, “trial 
judges ‘are the judicial system’”). 
113. Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing 
Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1248 (2004) (citing 
McBryde v. Comm. to Rev. Cir. Council Conduct & Disability Ords., 264 F.3d 52, 65 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001)).  
114. See generally id.  
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error” rule typically shields judges from disciplinary action based 
on one erroneous decision, “most cases in which judicial error [is] 
elevated to the level of judicial misconduct involve[] more than 
one example of legal error, and a pattern is one of the identified 
exceptions to the ‘mere legal error’ rule.”115  Additionally, “[a]n 
intentional failure to follow the law, even with a benign motive, 
constitutes bad faith and consequently judicial misconduct.”116  
While recognizing the importance of balancing the interest 
of judicial independence with the need for accountability in cases 
of judicial misconduct, New York’s highest court rationally 
articulated that “the judiciary, the Bar, and the public are better 
served when an established course of misconduct is appropriately 
redressed and an unfit incumbent is removed from the Bench.”117  
Judges need not concern themselves that a “mere oversight[] or 
misreading[] of the law” will result in sanction for legal error.118  
Instead, judges must simply “comply with clear due process 
requirements and avoid bullying and patently unfair conduct.”119  
The interests of judicial independence are sufficiently 
safeguarded by the “mere legal error” rule, while the rule’s 
exceptions make it possible “to hold judges accountable for 
decisions that are clearly contrary to law, that were reached 
without following the procedures that confer legitimacy and 
credence upon judicial actions, that represent an exercise of 
discretion motivated by bad faith, or that reflect repeated legal 
error that cannot be attributed to an honest mistake.”120 
 One under-utilized avenue for recourse is filing a complaint 
with Arkansas’s JDDC.  While the Commission can choose to 
open an investigation and issue punishment against any judge in 
Arkansas on its own,121 the Commission’s members typically 
have full-time jobs, and they cannot know what is going on in 
 
115. Id. at 1263. 
116. Id. at 1268. 
117. In re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872, 881 (N.Y. 1998). 
118. Gray, supra note 113, at 1280 (adding that judicial independence is not threatened 
simply because “the possibility of discipline for legal error may induce . . . second thoughts 
before judicial decision-making”). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. ARK. JUD. DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY COMM’N r. 8(A) (2013).  
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every courtroom in Arkansas if they are not made aware.  Because 
a judge who has immunity has not been held liable in a court of 
law, the ethical complaint process is a way of putting a judge “on 
notice,” so to speak, for his or her bad behavior.122  
In 2014, the Commission admonished a district court judge 
in Craighead County for instituting an illegal fee of $35.00 that 
was levied “against certain defendants, for changing a plea from 
‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty.’”123  While the Letter of Admonishment 
put the judge on notice, the voters had the final word when he 
subsequently lost reelection in 2016.124  Complaints may be made 
to the Commission anonymously or with the complainant’s name 
attached,125 so attorneys, prosecutors, and public defenders who 
witness unlawful behavior in the courtroom can make a report 
without fear of retaliation.  While anyone can make a complaint, 
the average citizen is likely not aware of this avenue for recourse.  
Therefore, attorneys should more frequently utilize this remedial 
measure to put judges on notice, so if their behavior continues, 
the punishment will further escalate. 
B. Enumerating Specific Factors for Consideration in 
Arkansas’s Statute 
Arkansas’s applicable statute, as it stands, requires that a 
judge must consider: 
(A) The financial resources of the defendant and the burden 
that payment of restitution will impose with regard to 
another obligation of the defendant;  
(B) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an 
installment basis or on another condition to be fixed by the 
court; and  
(C) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment 
of restitution and the method of payment.126   
 
122. See id. at 8(D).  
123. Press Release, supra note 54, at 1.  
124. Keith Blackman, BALLOTPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/RFQ6-GUYA] (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2021).  
125. ARK. JUD. DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY COMM’N r. 8(A). 
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2)(A)-(C) (2015). 
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Currently, the statute—on its face—seems adequate.  However, 
as stated above, the statute’s lack of specificity leaves too much 
ambiguity and room for interpretation as to what exactly is 
required.127  Implementation is the issue. 
The statute should instead require specific inquiries.  These 
requirements need not even go beyond what questions a person 
would generally ask to determine someone’s net worth.  The court 
should first determine the individual’s anticipated monthly 
income.  Next, the court should establish whether the individual 
has any dependents relying on their monthly income.  On a similar 
note, the court should ascertain the individual’s monthly living 
expenses (i.e., monthly housing cost, the average cost of utilities 
per month, groceries, etc.).  An individual should not have to miss 
a rent payment or forego running water for themselves and their 
families to prioritize, for example, a speeding ticket.  
Additionally, the court may inquire into whether an individual 
possesses any liquid assets.   
If the statute were to enumerate specific factors for review, 
there would be significantly less grey area when analyzing a 
person’s realistic ability to pay and on what schedule.  Because 
there are so many small local courts across the state of Arkansas, 
it can be difficult to ensure each court is adhering to the same set 
of legal procedures and upholding society’s expectation of ethics 
in the judiciary.  In reducing statutory ambiguity, the legislature 
could positively effect change in a concrete and cognizable way.   
C. Improving Record-Keeping, Transparency, and 
Accountability 
Another obstacle for justice—particularly in rural 
communities—is the lack of adequate record-keeping.128  This is 
a problem because many times, defendants “have no way to track 
the total debt owed or ensure their payments are properly applied 
to their outstanding debt[s].”129  And while community service is 
 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10. 
128. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3. 
129. Id. 
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typically a stated alternative to paying fines and fees,130 poor 
record-keeping creates a possible scenario in which a person 
completes their community service time, frequently taking time 
away from work or other obligations to do so, only to learn later 
that there is no such record of their completion of community 
service, forcing them to start over.   
Furthermore, community service is not a legitimate 
alternative in many cases.  For example, according to court filings 
in Mahoney:  
individuals must make arrangements with the local police or 
other authorities in the town where the conviction occurred 
. . . [and t]hey may be denied the opportunity to work at the 
discretion of other municipal officials for any reason, 
including that there is no work available that day, not enough 
work available, or that no one is available to administer it.131   
One plaintiff tried three times to no avail to complete community 
service, and because the judge suspended his license, he had to 
walk “to the police station in below-freezing weather only to be 
told that it was too cold to work that day.”132  Unfortunately, 
community service is not always a reliable alternative to payment.  
Additionally, the Mahoney plaintiffs alleged numerous 
instances in which they corresponded with the clerk of court to 
make a partial payment, obtain an extension, or explain their 
inability to pay, but were nonetheless arrested for failure to pay.133  
When a sloppy administrative error on the part of the State can 
result in jail time, an issue clearly exists.  For example, the “Beebe 
Department [in White County] serves a community of just 8,000 
people[,]” yet over a span of two years, the judge issued “more 
than 4,000 warrants for failure to pay fines . . . in the Beebe 
Department alone.”134  To promote uniformity and give people 
the confidence that record-keeping accurately reflects agreed-
upon extensions, community service, and any other relevant 
 
130. CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, A BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO FINES AND FEES? 
COMMUNITY SERVICE MANDATES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/G8NE-A728]. 
131. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 17-18. 
132. Id. at 18.   
133. Id. at 19-20.  
134. Id. at 20. 
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information, there must be an updated system to promote 
accountability and transparency within the courts.  An online 
system in which individuals can check their outstanding balances, 
make required payments, confirm payment due dates, track their 
community service, and upload relevant financial information 
would be considerably more practical than record-keeping by 
hand at the courthouse.  
V.  HOW THE SYSTEM STAGNATES ARKANSAS’S 
ECONOMY 
The anti-tax lobby told voters they would get something for 
nothing—the state or municipality would tighten its belt a little, it 
would collect big money from low-level offenders, and everything 
would be fine.  This hurt not only the poor.  In state after state the 
dismantling of the tax base crippled public education and 
damaged the futures of children across lines of income, hurting 
many more children than just those who live in poverty.135 
 
A system in which people are cyclically jailed because of 
their inability to pay fines and fees is doomed to result in a net-
negative economic outcome.136  While government officials often 
perceive fines and fees as an attractive alternative to raising taxes, 
they are less profitable than they may initially appear.  
A. Cost of Arkansas’s County Jails 
Pulaski County, the most populous county in the state with 
nearly 400,000 residents,137 spent a staggering $27,123,125.68 on 
its county jail in 2017.138  Calhoun County, the least populated 
county in the state with 4,739 residents,139 spent $417,986.22 on 
 
135. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at xvi. 
136. See Carl Takei, WTF? Our Tax Dollars Are Being Spent to Jail a Vet for Being 
Poor, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (May 28, 2014), [https://perma.cc/J9GN-8L9X].  
137. Arkansas Counties by Population, ARK. DEMOGRAPHICS BY CUBIT, 
[https://perma.cc/GRT7-PB8F] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021). 
138. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., LOCAL GOVERNMENT INMATE COST REPORT (2017), 
[https://perma.cc/A98Z-EUTD].  
139. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.  
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a county jail that only holds twenty-two inmates.140  Washington 
County, the state’s third most populous county,141 spends over 
$19 million on its county jail,142 with smaller counties like 
Poinsett (population 22,965)143 spending almost $1.5 million on 
its county jail.144  Craighead County (population 111,231)145 
spent nearly $9 million on its county jail in 2017.146  According 
to the Association of Arkansas Counties’ report, the average 
verified cost-per-day across the state to house one inmate is 
$71.48.147 
The amount of money Arkansas’s counties are expending on 
jails has steadily risen over the last twenty years, with the 
Sebastian County jail budget increasing by 53%, over $3 million, 
from 2006 to 2019.148  When viewing these numbers, one should 
consider the context that, nationally, Arkansas ranks 48th in 
Public Health, 41st in Education, 43rd in Infrastructure, 48th in 
Crime and Corrections, and 47th in Public Safety.149  Clearly, the 
increased spending on jails is not leading to an increase in public 
safety.  In a 2020 report authored by Human Rights Watch, the 
recommendations of how to effectively improve public safety 
included investing in education to advance the quality of schools, 
“stop[ping] enforcing laws in ways that effectively criminalize 
people for their poverty[,]” investing in initiatives that provide 
training and employment, providing “sufficient and adequate 
health care,” and “[v]astly reduc[ing] pretrial incarceration so that 
only those accused of serious crimes and found to pose a specific 
danger to others can be held in custody.”150 
Arkansas’s ranking in these indicators should be a wake-up 
call that the State’s current investments are not productive.  From 
 
140. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.  
141. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137. 
142. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.  
143. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137. 
144. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.  
145. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137. 
146. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138. 
147. Id. 
148. Saccente, supra note 65.  
149. Arkansas: #44 in Overall Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
[https://perma.cc/5LZ6-LV2J] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).  
150. A Roadmap for Re-imagining Public Safety in the United States, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Aug. 12, 2020, 8:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/WW2X-63CR]. 
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the personal narratives in this Comment, one can deduce that this 
cycle of never-ending, court-imposed fines and fees only 
contributes to the larger problem.  The Brennan Center for Justice 
has rightfully pointed out that because “the burden of fees and 
fines falls largely on the poor” it is “much like a regressive tax” 
with “mounting balances [that] underscore [their] finding that 
fees and fines are an unreliable source of government revenue.”151  
The report further notes that, “[j]ailing those unable to pay fees 
and fines is especially costly—sometimes as much as 115 percent 
of the amount collected—and generates no revenue[,]” pointing 
out that this “practice is not just unconstitutional but also 
irrational.”152 
B. Fines and Fees as a Revenue Generator 
Across the country, states and localities use fines and fees to 
generate revenue.153  While revenue generation might sound good 
in theory, an accurate cost-benefit analysis typically reveals that 
fines and fees are not so profitable in reality.  An in-depth study 
of “the costs for state and local governments to enforce and collect 
fees and fines” revealed massive waste, illustrating that “[t]he net 
gain might be far less than [states] have imagined, [and] the losses 
far more damaging.”154  New Mexico’s Bernalillo County is the 
perfect example as it is “operat[ing] at a loss in this regard, 
spending more than $1.17 per dollar it raises in revenue from fees 
and fines.”155  However, the actual loss is impossible to calculate 
as the study did not “take into account many of the counties’ 
investments in this work, like the time and staffing spent on 
 
151. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 5. 
152. Id.  
153. RON DEUTSCH & CARA LONG CORRA, FISCAL POLICY INST., FINES AND FEES: 
RAISING REVENUE AT THE COMMUNITY’S EXPENSE 1 (2020), [https://perma.cc/K5Z8-
RX6W].  
154. Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Matthew Menendez, Fees, Fines and Ability to Pay, HILL 
(Feb. 10, 2020, 1:30 PM), [https://perma.cc/9TU2-CURS] (explaining how “[t]he IRS 
spends one-third of a penny for every dollar that it collects in taxes[,]” while in the Texas 
and New Mexico counties studied, “the governments spend more than 41 cents of every 
dollar of revenue they raise to collect the fees and fines they impose in jail costs and in-court 
proceedings alone”).  
155. Id. 
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enforcing warrants and suspending driver’s licenses for 
nonpayment of debts.”156 
Although I could not account for all the costs associated with 
collecting fines and fees in Arkansas, I was able to determine 
what percentage of each county’s revenue came from fines and 
fees in 2019.  Using each county’s most recent financial audit,157 
I divided the county’s annual revenue generated from municipal 
fines and fees by the county’s total annual revenue to determine 
the percentage of total revenue generated by fines and fees for 
each county.  Below, Figure 1 serves as a visual illustration of my 
findings.158  The x-axis lists the counties in order from least to 
greatest in terms of percentage of total revenue generated through 








157. County audits for each fiscal year can be accessed on the Arkansas’s Legislative 
Audit website.  See Search Audits, ARK. LEGIS. AUDIT, [https://perma.cc/DLB3-GGDC] 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2021).  
158. In addition to being available by search of the 2019 audits on the Arkansas Audit 
website, the documents, as well as excel sheets supporting the findings depicted on Figure 1 
























Figure 1: Percentage of Arkansas Counties' 
Revenues Generated from Fines & Fees
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As Figure 1 demonstrates, the rate at which counties are 
depending on revenue from fines and fees varies.  In larger 
counties, the percentage is lower because of the high rate of 
property tax revenue.  However, when federal aid and state aid 
are not accounted for as “revenues,” the percentage grows 
significantly in some counties.  Additionally, a conflict of interest 
arises when counties project an anticipated amount of revenue in 
this category.  When an amount is projected in the county’s 
budget and is considered unearned revenue, law enforcement 
officers, prosecutors, and judges alike are put into situations 
where their interest in accruing that unearned revenue can conflict 
with an equal and impartial application of the law.159  
Anne Kim, Vice President of Domestic Policy at the 
Progressive Policy Institute,160 explains in her piece for 
Governing that “[b]ecause the burden of these penalties falls 
disproportionately on people who can’t afford to pay, 
jurisdictions collect far less than expected and waste resources 
chasing down payments that won’t materialize.”161  Further, “as 
many as one-fourth of local inmates were in jail for nonpayment 
of fines and fees” in some jurisdictions, and “[i]n addition to its 
direct expenses, incarceration—even short stints in jail—can lead 
to costly outcomes, including unemployment, dependence on 
public benefits and greater risk of crime.”162  Because these 
revenues come at such a high cost both financially and socially,163 
each county should work to decrease its reliance on this revenue 
 
159. See Fines, Fees, and Financial Burdens, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
[https://perma.cc/2E2F-RHHC] (last visited Apr. 3, 2021) (explaining that many places use 
fines and fees to fund court systems and local governments creating an inherent conflict of 
interest); see, e.g., Matt Ford, The Problem With Funding Government Through Fines, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), [https://perma.cc/M2TK-UTQC] (discussing an issue that arose 
in Nevada when tickets and fines revenue fell short of what the state legislature projected in 
its two-year budget, resulting in shortfalls of $700,000 in year one and $1.4 million in year 
two).  
160. Anne Kim: Columnist, GOVERNING, [https://perma.cc/3MBZ-2NEW] (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2021). 
161. Anne Kim, When Cities Rely on Fines and Fees, Everybody Loses, GOVERNING 
(Aug. 22, 2018), [https://perma.cc/K4SD-CCUE]. 
162. Id. 
163. See id. (referencing “[a] 2014 study of Alabama court costs” which found that 
“collection rates [were] under 10 percent on average—despite countless hours spent by staff 
pursuing payment”).  
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source.  In doing so, counties could stop wasting money on fine 
collection efforts and incarcerating people who cannot afford to 
pay, allowing the citizens of Arkansas to put their money back 
into our state’s economy instead of dragging around the ball and 
chain of legal financial obligations for weeks, months, or in many 
cases, years.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Lawsuits have forced debtors’ prisons out of business in 
increasing numbers, mostly in specific counties and 
municipalities, but there are more venues to be tackled.164 
 
Even though the United States Supreme Court, state 
legislatures, and the vast majority of legal scholars are in 
agreement that debtors’ prisons are both unethical and 
unconstitutional, people in Arkansas and across America are still 
jailed every day simply because they cannot pay the legal 
financial burdens that they face.  Regardless of statutes and case 
law that seemingly ban this practice, it is clear that these 
safeguards have fallen far short of ensuring poverty is not 
criminalized.  
Whether or not one may personally empathize with the 
victims of this system, it is in everyone’s best interest to reform 
it.  Not only does jailing poor people have no positive impact on 
their ability to pay their legal financial obligations, but it also 
almost always has the opposite effect—frequently leading to 
unemployment, additional debt, and less money circulating in our 
economy to support Arkansas’s businesses.  The State itself 
would benefit from reforming this system too.  As it stands now, 
the system of fines and fees collections is a drain on taxpayer 
dollars, does not effectively reduce or deter crime, and stagnates 
our state’s economy.  
 
 
164. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 28. 
